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McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Company A, John Doe 1, John Doe 1’s lawyer, and 
John Doe 2 are the subjects of an ongoing grand jury 
investigation into an allegedly fraudulent business scheme.2 
John Doe 1 brought this appeal after the government obtained 
access to an email he claimed was privileged. Before 
presenting the email in question to the grand jury, the 
government asked the district court for permission to do so. 
The district court granted permission, finding that although 
the email was protected by the work product privilege, the 
crime-fraud exception to that doctrine applied. John Doe 1 
then filed an interlocutory appeal, requesting that our Court 
reverse the district court’s order.  
  
 On January 12, 2016, when we heard oral argument in 
this case, the grand jury had not yet issued any indictments. 
However, while this appeal was still pending, the district 
court permitted the grand jury to view the email in question. 
                                              
2 We use pseudonyms to refer to the grand jury subjects to 
protect the secrecy of the grand jury investigation and the 
anonymity of the subjects. 
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On March 31, 2016, the grand jury returned a seventeen-
count indictment, charging John Doe 1, John Doe 1’s lawyer, 
and John Doe 2 with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail 
fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. For the reasons that 
follow, we hold that we do not have jurisdiction to hear the 




A. John Doe 1, John Doe 2, and Company A 
 
Company A, John Doe 1, and John Doe 2 were 
subjects of an ongoing grand jury investigation that sought to 
determine whether they and others undertook fraudulent 
business transactions in order to launder money and settle 
lawsuits under false pretenses. Company A was incorporated 
in Florida in 2008. John Doe 1 was the president and the “sole 
proprietor” of that company.3 Nonetheless, a November 2008 
document purports to memorialize John Doe 1’s sale of one 
hundred percent of the shares of Company A to a corporation 
we will call Company B for $10,000. John Doe 2 is the sole 
owner of Company B. Following this purchase agreement, 
John Doe 1 claims that John Doe 2 engaged John Doe 1 and 
his associates to be responsible for Company A’s day-to-day 
operations. However, numerous filings and tax documents 
suggested that John Doe 1 maintained control and ownership 
of Company A even after Company A was purportedly 
transferred. 
 
 Since at least 2000, multiple individuals have sued 
John Doe 1 and his businesses in state courts around the 
country based on John Doe 1’s business practices. One such 
lawsuit was a class action filed against Company A in Indiana 
state court. In this class action, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Company A’s business practices violated various Indiana 
state laws. They sought to hold John Doe 1 accountable for 
these violations. However, during this litigation, John Doe 1 
averred in a deposition that he had transferred ownership of 
Company A to Company B. John Doe 2 then represented that 
                                              
3 January J.A. at 6, 32.  
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Company A was no longer in business and had limited assets. 
Shortly after John Doe 1’s deposition, the Indiana plaintiffs 
settled their lawsuit for approximately $260,000, about ten 
percent of the value that attorneys for the plaintiffs had put on 
the lawsuit. 
 
B. District Court Grand Jury Proceedings & Interlocutory 
Appeal 
 
 Thereafter, the government empaneled a grand jury to 
investigate John Does 1 and 2. In the course of this 
investigation, a grand jury subpoena was sent to John Doe 1’s 
accountant requesting that he provide the government with 
John Doe 1’s personal and corporate tax returns. Among 
other things, these tax documents revealed that John Doe 1 
had claimed one hundred percent ownership of Company A 
every tax year from 2008 through 2012. The accountant also 
told an IRS agent that, at some point in 2013, John Doe 1’s 
lawyer informed him that John Doe 1 had sold Company A to 
John Doe 2 in 2008. He also informed investigators that he 
might have taken notes on this conversation. The government 
requested those notes, and the accountant’s attorney sent the 
government three documents. 
 
 One of these documents was an email John Doe 1 had 
sent to the accountant on July 16, 2013, forwarding an email 
that John Doe 1’s lawyer had sent to John Doe 1 four days 
earlier. The contents of this email could be read to incriminate 
John Doe 1, John Doe 1’s lawyer, and John Doe 2. The email 
instructs John Doe 1 of the steps he should take to correct his 
records so that they reflect that John Doe 2, not John Doe 1, 
owned Company A since 2008. When John Doe 1 forwarded 
this email to his accountant, he simply wrote: “Please see the 
seventh paragraph down re; my tax returns. Then we can 
discuss this.” Thus, the email can be interpreted as evidence 
of John Does 1 and 2’s fraudulent scheme.  
 
 The day after the accountant provided this email to the 
government, the accountant’s attorney sought to recall it on 
the ground that it was privileged and had been inadvertently 
included in his client’s production. The accountant’s counsel, 
however, also told the government that his client believed the 
email was asking the accountant to perform an accounting 
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service, not a legal service. The government argued that under 
such circumstances, John Doe 1 waived any privilege that 
might have otherwise attached to his lawyer’s email. 
Nonetheless, based on this dispute, the government 
temporarily refrained from presenting the email to the grand 
jury. Instead, the government moved for permission to show 
the email on January 23, 2015. John Doe 1 opposed this 
motion.  
 
 The district court ruled that the government could 
present the email to the grand jury on June 1, 2015. As the 
district court explained in its memorandum opinion, John Doe 
1 did not forward this email to his accountant to seek legal 
advice or obtain such advice. Accordingly, his forwarding of 
the email destroyed the attorney-client privilege attached to 
this document. Nevertheless, the district court did find that 
the work-product privilege attached to the email because the 
accountant could not be considered an adversary. The court 
then concluded that the crime-fraud exception to the work-
product privilege applied. On this basis, the court permitted 
the government to present the email to the grand jury. 
 
 Immediately after the district court handed down its 
decision, John Doe 1 filed an interlocutory appeal, requesting 
that we reverse this order. We heard oral argument on January 
12, 2016. While the appeal to our Court was pending, 
however, the grand jury returned a seventeen-count 
indictment charging John Doe 1, his lawyer, and John Doe 2, 
with conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations Act, conspiracy, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, and money laundering.  
 
After this indictment, we requested supplemental 
briefing from the parties on whether this appeal was moot in 
light of the indictment. We also asked the government to 
inform us whether the grand jury had been discharged.  
 
In response, the government explained that the grand 
jury had been discharged shortly after it returned the 
indictment. However, the government also informed us that a 
new grand jury has been empaneled and is investigating new 
charges against John Doe 1 and others. The government is 
also considering a superseding indictment. The government 
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has informed us that if it seeks a superseding indictment from 
the newly empaneled grand jury, it will present the disputed 
email to the grand jury in support of charges that would be 
contained in the superseding indictment. Accordingly, both 
John Doe 1 and the government agree that the appeal is not 
moot due to the continuing investigation.  
 
Nonetheless, the government now contends that we 
lack jurisdiction over this appeal under In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 631 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980). John Doe 
disagrees. For the following reasons, we agree with the 





This appeal presents a complicated and novel procedural fact 
pattern, which complicates the issue of our jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, as we shall explain, we conclude that we lack 
jurisdiction over this appeal.4 This conclusion is guided, in 
part, by the decisions of our sister circuits, which have dealt 
with cases more analogous to the present appeal.  
 
 
A. The Finality Rule  
 
“[T]he right to a judgment from more than one court is 
a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice.”5 
Congress has determined that courts of appeals shall only 
have jurisdiction over “final decisions” of the district courts.6 
As our Court has acknowledged, two attributes ordinarily 
define a final decision. “‘First, the decision will fully resolve 
all claims presented to the district court. Second, after the 
decision has been issued, there will be nothing further for the 
district court to do.’”7 Thus, “[w]hen a district court orders a 
                                              
4 The district court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 
18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
5 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
6 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
7 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 




witness—whether a party to an underlying litigation, a subject 
or target of a grand jury investigation, or a complete stranger 
to the proceedings—to testify or produce documents, its order 
generally is not considered an immediately appealable final 
decision under § 1291.”8 Therefore, disclosure orders are 
generally not final and cannot normally be challenged by an 
immediate, i.e. interlocutory, appeal. 
  
 Three considerations generally justify this finality 
requirement. First, the finality rule “helps preserve the respect 
due trial judges.”9 “Permitting piecemeal appeals would 
undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as 
the special role [they] play[] in our judicial system.”10 
Second, this requirement “minimizes a party’s opportunities 
to defeat the valid claims of his opponents through an endless 
barrage of appeals.”11 As Justice Frankfurter once explained, 
the finality rule “avoid[s] the obstruction to just claims that 
would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a 
succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to 
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of 
judgment.”12 Lastly and relatedly, the rule promotes 
efficiency by removing obstacles that would otherwise 
impede judicial process. “To be effective, judicial 
administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum 
would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the 
component elements in a unified cause.”13  
  
                                                                                                     
(3d Cir. 1997) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 
233 (1945))).  
8 Id. (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted) (citing 
United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-34 (1971), 
Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326-29, and Alexander v. United 
States, 201 U.S. 117, 118-22 (1906)). 
9 Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 263 (1984). 
10 Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 
(1981). 
11 In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 
1999). 




 These concerns are especially robust in criminal cases. 
14 As the Supreme Court has emphasized, “the delays and 
disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal are especially 
inimical to the effective and fair administration of the 
criminal law.”15 The particular importance of the finality 
requirement to criminal cases flows both from the accused’s 
Sixth Amendment right to as well as from society’s 
independent interest in a speedy trial: 
 
As time passes, the prosecution’s ability to meet 
its burden of proof may greatly diminish: 
evidence and witnesses may disappear, and 
testimony becomes more easily impeachable as 
the events recounted become more remote. 
Delay increases the cost of pretrial detention 
and extends “the period during which 
defendants released on bail may commit other 
crimes.” Delay between arrest and punishment 
prolongs public anxiety over community safety 
if a person accused of a serious crime is free on 
bail. It may also adversely affect the prospects 
for rehabilitation. Finally, when a crime is 
committed against a community, the 
community has a strong collective 
psychological and moral interest in swiftly 
bringing the person responsible to justice. 
Prompt acquittal of a person wrongly accused, 
which forces prosecutorial investigation to 
continue, is as important as prompt conviction 
and sentence of a person rightly accused. Crime 
inflicts a wound on the community, and that 
                                              
14 See United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., 458 U.S. 
263, 265 (1982) (“This Court has long held that [the doctrine 
of finality] . . . is inimical to piecemeal appellate review of 
trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation, and 
that this policy is at its strongest in the field of criminal law . . 
. .”); Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 325 (“These considerations of 
policy are especially compelling in the administration of 
criminal justice.”). 
15 DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962). 
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wound may not begin to heal until criminal 
proceedings have come to an end.16 
 
As a result, the finality rule takes on particular importance in 
criminal adjudications.  
 
B. The Contempt Rule 
 
To obtain immediate appellate review of a disclosure 
order, the order’s target must ordinarily comply with what is 
known as the “contempt rule”: He “must refuse compliance, 
be held in contempt, and then appeal the contempt order.”17 
The party may immediately appeal the district court’s 
contempt order because that order is a final judgment 
imposing penalties on the willfully disobedient party in what 
is effectively a separate proceeding.18  
 
The contempt route “is a firmly established feature of 
federal appellate procedure, . . . but the decision to travel that 
route must not be made lightly.”19 The rule, “though at times 
a harsh one, was formulated to discourage appeals in all but 
the most serious cases.”20 Requiring a person who objects to a 
disclosure order to “‘refuse to comply, be subjected to 
sanctions in contempt, and then appeal from the sanctions . . . 
[,] puts the objecting person’s sincerity to the test by attaching 
a price to the demand for immediate review.’”21  
                                              
16 Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 264-65 (1984) 
(quoting United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 862 
(1978) and citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 520 
(1972)). 
17 Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 18 n.11 
(1992) (citing United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971)); 
see also Cobbledick, 309 U.S. at 326-29; Alexander v. United 
States, 201 U.S. 117, 118-22 (1906). 
18 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d 133, 143 (3d Cir. 2012). 
19 Id. 
20 In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 800 (3d Cir. 
1979). 
21 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 143 (alteration in original) 





C. The Perlman Exception to the Contempt Rule  
 
Nevertheless, an exception to this contempt rule does 
exist for a limited class of parties. In Perlman v. United 
States,22 the Supreme Court declined to apply the contempt 
rule to a party who did not have control over the target of the 
district court’s disclosure order. That case centered on the 
seized exhibits of a patent holder, Louis Perlman. These 
exhibits first came into the possession of a district court when 
Perlman testified on behalf of his company in a patent 
infringement trial.23 When the company moved to dismiss its 
suit without prejudice, the district court granted the 
company’s motion. Nonetheless, it ordered the court clerk to 
impound the exhibits Perlman used during his testimony and 
to maintain them under seal.24 Soon after this infringement 
suit ended, the government initiated a grand jury investigation 
of Perlman, suspecting that he had committed perjury during 
the patent trial.25 To assist in the investigation, the 
government sought an order from the district court directing 
the court clerk to produce the exhibits Perlman used during 
his testimony.26 Perlman objected, claiming that such use of 
his exhibits would constitute an unreasonable search and 
seizure and render him a compulsory witness against himself 
in violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.27 The 
district court disagreed with Perlman and ordered the clerk to 
produce the exhibits to the government.28  
 
Perlman then appealed to the Supreme Court. There, 
the government argued that the district court’s disclosure 
order was not appealable.29 The Supreme Court disagreed. 
The Court reasoned that because “Perlman was powerless to 
avert the mischief,” he should not be required to “accept its 
                                              
22 247 U.S. 7 (1918). 
23 Id. at 8. 
24 Id. at 8-9. 
25 Id. at 9-10. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 10, 13. 
28 Id. at 10-11. 
29 Id. at 12. 
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incidence and seek a remedy at some other time and in some 
other way.”30 In other words, because the exhibits were not in 
his possession, he could not refuse to produce them, standing 
in contempt to obtain an immediate appeal. Because the 
contempt route was unavailable to him, he was “powerless to 
avert the mischief” of their production.31 
 
As our Court has explained, “though the Perlman 
doctrine’s reach has not been set precisely by the Supreme 
Court, it generally permits an interlocutory appeal of a 
disclosure order if [that order] is directed at a disinterested 
third party lacking a sufficient stake in the proceeding to risk 
contempt by refusing compliance.”32 In such a circumstance, 
the privilege holder is permitted to appeal immediately 
without suffering contempt sanctions. Because the privilege 
holder himself cannot disobey the disclosure order and the 
third party at whom the disclosure order is directed is unlikely 
to do so on his behalf, the privilege holder is permitted an 
immediate appeal.33 
 
Despite the general acceptance of the Perlman 
exception, the Supreme Court clarified in 2009 that disclosure 
orders averse to the attorney-client privilege do not qualify 
for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine. 
After the Supreme Court handed down Mohawk Industries, 
Inc. v. Carpenter,34 appellate courts grappled with the 
question of whether and to what extent Mohawk narrowed the 
Perlman exception.  
 
                                              
30 Id. at 13. 
31 Id.  
32 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 144 (citing Church of 
Scientology, 506 U.S. at 18 n.11 and United States v. Nixon, 
418 U.S. 683, 691 (1974)). 
33 See id.; In re Grand Jury Empanelled Aug. 14, 1979, 638 
F.2d 1235, 1237 (3d Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Applicants, 
619 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir. 1979). 
34 558 U.S. 100, 112 (2009); see also Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). 
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For our part, we declined “to hold that the Supreme 
Court narrowed the Perlman doctrine—at least in the grand 
jury context—sub silentio.”35 As we noted in In re Grand 
Jury,  
the Mohawk Court gave no clear indication that 
[overruling Perlman] was a consequence of its 
intended holding. It did not discuss, mention, or 
even cite Perlman, a fact that is not that 
surprising given that the Perlman doctrine and 
the collateral order doctrine recognize separate 
exceptions to the general rule of finality under § 
1291.36  
 
Therefore, we concluded that “the Perlman exception remains 
viable.”37 
 
D. Application of the Perlman Exception to the Present 
Appeal 
 
The Perlman exception generally applies to disclosure 
orders only when they are directed at disinterested third 
parties who lack sufficient stake in the proceedings to risk 
contempt.38 Examples of such disinterested third parties 
include former counsel39 or court clerks.40 However, where 
current counsel or employees hold the targeted documents, 
we have held that the party claiming the privilege can take 
possession of those documents, refuse to comply with a 
subpoena, and invite the sanction of contempt, which would 
then afford an avenue for appeal.41  
 
In the present appeal, John Doe 1’s accountant was an 
agent of John Doe 1. Therefore, John Doe 1 could have taken 
possession of the email in question and risked contempt 
sanctions himself. However, before he had the opportunity to 
                                              
35 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 145. 
36 Id. at 46. 
37 Id.  
38 Id. at 144. 
39 Id. at 148.  
40 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 12-13 (1918). 
41 In re Grand Jury, 705 F.3d at 148. 
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take such an action, the accountant produced the email in 
question to the government. Therefore, this appeal presents a 
slightly different fact pattern than the normal Perlman 
exception. John Doe was not stripped of the opportunity to 
stand in contempt of the district court’s order by some 
disinterested third party; rather, his own agent’s error led to 
this result. Therefore, it is not clear that, given the opportunity 
to seize the email in question, John Doe 1 would have been 
willing to stand in contempt of this order. He did not have to 
pay the price normally exacted in exchange for immediate 
review.42 
 
Two other courts of appeals have already examined the 
question of whether a party’s inadvertent production of 
privileged documents disqualifies it from seeking the 
Perlman exception’s protection; they reached different 
results. First, in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean 
Transportation,43 the D.C. Circuit held that the Perlman 
exception applied to an inadvertent production of documents 
that the party’s former counsel specifically marked 
“privileged.” In the course of its investigation into Sea-Land 
Services, the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice sought certain records from the 
company.44 In August 1976, the district court issued a 
subpoena to Sea-Land, and Sea-Land instructed its counsel to 
withhold from production all documents that might be 
covered by the attorney-client privilege.45 In response, the 
company’s attorney marked certain privileged documents 
with a “P.” Nonetheless, counsel turned over both these 
marked documents as well as non-marked documents to the 
government.46 Because counsel turned over Sea-Land’s 
documents contrary to Sea-Land’s express instructions, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the Perlman exception applied.47  
  
                                              
42 See Wilson v. O’Brien, 621 F.3d 641, 643 (7th Cir. 2010). 
43 604 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam). 
44 Id. at 673. 
45 Id. at 674. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 673. 
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 The second appellate court decision regarding the 
Perlman exception’s applicability to inadvertently produced 
documents is more akin to the present appeal. In In re Grand 
Jury Subpoena,48 the Fifth Circuit distinguished Ocean 
Transportation and held that a party’s inadvertent production 
of documents did not fall under the Perlman exception. 
There, the corporate appellant produced approximately 5000 
documents in response to a subpoena.49 After this production, 
the appellant learned that a document that was marked 
privileged was handed over as part of this production dump.50 
But the Fifth Circuit held that the Perlman exception did not 
apply to this document. As that court explained, “[t]his is not 
a case where a disinterested third party controlled the fate of 
the documents disclosed, nor is it a case where the documents 
were stolen or seized.”51 The court reasoned the appellants 
“themselves controlled the fate of the documents at issue,” 
and, therefore, “the criminal justice system should not be 
made to bear the brunt of their inadequate precautions.”52 
  
 The Fifth Circuit decision is instructive for one other 
reason. The district court had also engaged in a procedural 
misstep related to the in camera review of other documents.53 
District courts often review documents in camera to assess 
whether they must be produced to the opposing party. If a 
court determines that documents should be produced, it must 
order the party to whom the documents belong to produce 
them to its adversary. The owner of the documents can obtain 
immediate appellate review of such an order by refusing to 
hand over the documents and standing in contempt of the 
district court’s order. In the Fifth Circuit case, however, the 
district court itself made the documents available to the 
government following the in camera review, thereby robbing 
                                              
48 190 F.3d 375, 385-87 (5th Cir. 1999). 
49 Id. at 377. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 386 (citing Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 10 
(1918) & In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley 
and Co., 629 F.2d 548, 550 (8th Cir. 1980)).  
52 Id.  
53 Id. at 387-88. 
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the appellants of the contempt route.54 The corporate 
appellants urged the Fifth Circuit to work around the district 
court’s procedural misstep by “applying the Perlman 
exception and collateral order doctrine to determine 
jurisdiction.”55 The Fifth Circuit declined this invitation, 
explaining that “employing that approach in this case would 
plunge us into the very difficult issue of deciding whether, in 
determining if the acts Corporate Appellants are alleged to 
have committed even constitute a crime for purposes of 
applying the crime-fraud exception.”56 The Fifth Circuit 
found it improper to “reach[] the merits of a secret, ongoing 
grand jury investigation.”57 Therefore, the court decided 
against the work-around the appellants requested. Instead, the 
court chose to correct this procedural flaw by granting 
mandamus and ordering the district court to return the 
documents to the appellants so that they had the option of 
standing in contempt of court.58 
  
 Such a writ would have also been acceptable in the 
present appeal, before the grand jury had a chance to view the 
email and issue its indictment. Had the email been returned to 
John Doe 1, and then ordered produced, John Doe 1 would 
have had the option to stand in contempt of court, testing his 
willingness to produce the email in question. Because John 
Doe 1 did not obtain such a writ, we must decide whether the 
Perlman exception applies. 
  
 The purpose of the Perlman doctrine is to protect 
defendants from the government using privileged documents 
before a grand jury. It is necessary because, in situations 
where the doctrine applies, defendants are unable to subject 
themselves to the contempt of court that would ordinarily 
grant them standing to challenge the disclosure. In Perlman, 
the Court stated “Perlman contends that the proposed use by 
the United States before the grand jury of the exhibits as a 
basis for an indictment against him constitutes an 
                                              
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 388. 
56 Id. at 388-89. 
57 Id. at 389. 
58 Id.  
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unreasonable seizure . . . .”59 The purpose of the doctrine, 
therefore, is to protect against the use of privileged 
documents “as a basis for an indictment.” Accordingly, 
where, as here, an indictment is returned that relies upon 
purportedly privileged documents, the doctrine’s purpose is 
no longer served. 
  
 At least one other court of appeals is in accord. In 
United States v. Calandra,60 the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit explained that “[i]t is the possibility of 
disclosure of information which is thought to be confidential 
that is central to the Perlman exception.”61 There, the 
information at issue had also already been disclosed to 
government agents. As a result, the Seventh Circuit reasoned 
that there was no need for immediate appellate review62: 
Disclosure of information confounds the very purpose of the 
Perlman exception. As Calandra explained,  
 
In the event that the present trial results in a 
conviction, this jurisdictional ruling on the 
interlocutory appeal does not foreclose raising 
the privilege issue again on direct appeal. It 
obviously would then be too late to retrieve the 
alleged privileged testimony from further 
exposure, but not too late to consider its impact, 
if any, upon the conviction.63  
 
 Similarly, the disclosure of the email to the grand jury 
prior to the indictment here undermines the very purpose of 
the Perlman exception. The grand jury has already seen the 
email at issue in this appeal. Deciding now that the disclosure 
of that email was improper will not repair the breach of 
confidentiality that already occurred: The jurors cannot un-
see that email any more than the proverbial bell can be un-
                                              
59 Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7, 13 (1918) (emphases 
added). 
60 706 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1983). 
61 Id. at 228. 
62 Id. 
63 Id.  
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rung. Therefore, in this case, immediate appeal is not required 
under Perlman. 
 
E. Application of the Collateral Order Doctrine to the 
Present Appeal 
 
We find that the March indictment sufficiently tips the 
scales such that we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Reviewing Supreme 
Court and appellate court precedent on interlocutory appeals, 
two relevant principles become evident. First, and most 
importantly, where an appellant will have an opportunity for 
later review of his claims, the law disfavors interlocutory 
appeals. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that 
interlocutory appeals should only be accepted in “the limited 
class of cases where denial of immediate review would render 
impossible any review whatsoever of an individual’s 
claims.”64  
 
Similarly, we have held that interlocutory appeals 
during grand jury proceedings are inappropriate where 
appellants will have later opportunities to appeal the 
purportedly flawed grand jury proceedings. In In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings (Johanson),65 our Court held that we did 
not have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to 
hear an appeal of a district court order denying an evidentiary 
hearing. That appeal arose from multidistrict litigation 
investigating the Abscam scandal. After the press identified 
Louis C. Johanson as the target of the pending Abscam 
investigation, Johanson moved the district court to hold an 
evidentiary hearing to determine which federal employees 
released this confidential information.66 Johanson stated that 
he sought their identities so that he could move to disqualify 
them from participating in the grand jury proceedings in his 
case (his theory was that their participation in these 
proceedings would violate his Fifth Amendment right to an 
impartial grand jury).67  
                                              
64 United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533 (1971). 
65 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980). 
66 Id. at 1035-36. 




Nonetheless, the district court denied Johanson’s 
motion and allowed the grand jury investigation to proceed. 
Johanson then appealed the district court’s denial of his 
motion for an evidentiary hearing to our court and requested 
that we stay the grand jury proceedings to prevent his being 
indicted before resolution of his appeal.68 We refused to grant 
a stay of the grand jury proceedings, declining “to interrupt 
the grand jury’s investigation or to delay its decision.”69 The 
grand jury then returned an indictment against Johanson 
before we were able to rule on his appeal.70 
 
 When we did issue our decision, after Johanson’s 
indictment, we determined that we no longer had jurisdiction 
to rule on Johanson’s appeal of district court’s denial of his 
motion for an evidentiary hearing.71 Although we 
acknowledged that the grand jury proceedings in Johanson’s 
case may have been flawed, we recognized that any such 
flaws could be corrected on appeal after his trial, if he was 
convicted.  
 
[F]lawed grand jury proceedings can be 
effectively reviewed by this court and remedied 
after a conviction has been entered and all 
criminal proceedings have been terminated in 
the district court. Because delayed appellate 
review will not irreparably deny Johanson his 
right to an impartial grand jury (his conviction 
could be reversed if at a later stage we conclude 
the grand jury was tainted), the order is not 
reviewable immediately as a collateral order.72 
 
Because the indictment of Johanson had already issued, and, 
therefore, the criminal trial was “fairly in train,”73 we found 
                                              
68 Id. at 1038. 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 1039-40. 
72 Id. (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1955)). 
73 Di Bella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 131 (1962). 
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that we no longer had the requisite jurisdiction to hear his 
appeal of the evidentiary hearing motion.  
  
 The same logic applies here. Any flaw in the grand 
jury proceedings stemming from the disclosure of the email 
can be corrected on appeal if the appellants are convicted. In 
this case, John Doe 1 will have another opportunity to seek 
review of his claim. If he does not take a plea agreement, he 
will face trial, whether on the indictment that issued in March 
or on a superseding indictment that issues in the near future.74 
Therefore, “the criminal trial is [] fairly in train,” and John 
Doe 1’s appeal here is “truly interlocutory.”75 A party “is 
entitled to a single appeal, to be deferred until final judgment 
has been entered, in which claims of district court error at any 
stage of the litigation may be ventilated.”76 John Doe 1 is 
asking us to peek into the merits of his case to determine 
whether the crime-fraud exception applies. But he can go to 
trial—whether on this indictment or the next—and, if 
convicted, appeal this email issue. The collateral order 
doctrine simply does not give us jurisdiction in such 
circumstances. 
  
 In response to this point, the Dissent argues that our 
holding undermines judicial efficiency.77 As a general matter, 
we agree with our dissenting colleague that “in cases where 
we accept an appeal when it is filed, efficiency favors 
                                              
74 Moreover, even if John Doe 1 were to decide that a guilty 
plea was in his best interest, he could still seek to preserve his 
right to appeal this issue by tendering a conditional guilty 
plea. We know of nothing that would suggest such an offer 
would be rejected by the government or by the district court. 
Of course, we note this only as part of our academic 
discussion of finality and jurisdiction. We in no way intend to 
suggest anything about the merits of the prosecution or the 
propriety of any course of action that the appellant may wish 
to pursue.  
75 Id. 
76 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
868 (1994). 
77 Dissent at 9-11. 
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finishing what we started.”78 However, we do not agree that 
this general principle applies to the novel circumstances of 
this appeal.  
  
 The Dissent is correct that there is a possibility that 
this matter could someday return to us on appeal, which could 
result in some duplication of effort. However, the Dissent 
fails to acknowledge that there is also a possibility that John 
Doe 1 will neither be convicted at trial nor accept a plea 
agreement. In either event, John Doe 1 would no longer have 
reason to appeal the purported breach of privilege, and the 
case would not return to us. Moreover, though a newly 
empaneled jury continues to investigate John Doe 1, we can 
only speculate as to whether that proceeding will implicate 
the contested email or trigger another appeal on the same 
grounds. In the Dissent’s own words, the Government “may 
make further use of the email that Doe is asking us to keep 
confidential.”79 
  
 Basing our exercise of jurisdiction on a mere 
possibility that this case will return to us, or on the chance 
that the document will be used to support additional charges, 
would open the door to numerous interlocutory challenges. 
This is precisely the sort of fractured “leaden-footed[ness]”80 
that the finality rule seeks to prevent. The Dissent’s approach 
would also create line-drawing problems: How strong of a 
possibility is sufficient to create jurisdiction, and how do we 
quantify that possibility?  In our view, where a question can 
just as well be answered after a final ruling, and, indeed, may 
no longer require an answer at that time, the efficient path is 
to not arrest the momentum of trial court proceedings.  
  
 The Dissent also argues that our position conflicts with 
two of our prior cases.81 In response to our discussion of 
                                              
78 Id. at 10. 
79 Id. at 4 (emphasis added). 
80 Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
81 The Dissent also explains that it would reverse the district 
court and conclude that the crime-fraud exception to the 
attorney work product doctrine does not apply to the email at 




Johanson, the Dissent points out that the government’s 
investigation of John Doe 1, his lawyer, and John Doe 2 is 
ongoing.82 The government has notified our Court that it has 
empaneled a new grand jury that is “continuing to investigate 
unindicted persons, and considering whether additional 
charges should be brought against persons already 
indicted.”83 Although the existence of this ongoing 
investigation does slightly distinguish this case from 
Johanson’s, it does not undermine the applicability of 
Johanson to this appeal or create a difference. A new grand 
jury is considering a superseding indictment. This new 
indictment has not yet come to fruition. But if it does not, the 
government will go forward with the indictment it has already 
secured. The government has not suggested that it intends to 
dismiss the current indictment and every indication is to the 
contrary. Therefore, this case will go to trial (barring any plea 
agreement), either on the existing indictment or on a 
superseding indictment. Accordingly, the logic of Johanson 
applies, removing our jurisdiction over this appeal. 
  
 In addition, the Dissent claims that In re Search of 
Elec. Commc’ns in the Account of chakafattah@gmail.com at 
Internet Serv. Provider Google, Inc. (“Fattah”) undercuts our 
position.84 There, while under investigation by a grand jury, 
Congressman Chaka Fattah filed an appeal contesting a 
warrant to search his email account. We held that we had 
jurisdiction under Perlman despite the fact that an indictment 
had issued before our decision.85 We also held that the 
collateral order rule did not apply. We reasoned that it did not 
apply, in part, because we found that the district court’s order 
denying Fattah’s motion to quash the search warrant was not 
effectively unreviewable on appeal.86 According to the 
Dissent, Fattah is a prime example of how in a single case, 
post-proceedings review can be sufficient under the collateral 
                                                                                                     
because we find that we do not have jurisdiction over this 
appeal. 
82 Id. at 4. 
83 Gov’t May Br. at 1. 
84 802 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2015). 
85 Id. at 521 n.2, 529-30. 
86 Id. at 525-26. 
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order rule yet immediate appeal is still warranted under 
Perlman.87  
  
 However, a crucial fact distinguishes Fattah from the 
present appeal: the grand jury in that case never had access to 
the documents at issue.88 Here, the email has already been 
produced, the grand jury has already seen it, and it has 
returned an indictment—no doubt at least partly because of 
that email. Therefore, while the grand jury proceedings in 
Fattah had not been tainted by the document disclosure, the 
grand jury proceedings in this case potentially have. Whether 
this email should have been allowed to reach the grand jury, 
and, if not, whether it tainted the proceedings can just as 
easily be decided in a direct and final appeal of conviction 
(should the appellants be convicted) as in this interlocutory 
appeal. Therefore, because a party “is entitled to a single 
appeal,”89 we must wait for that final appeal to speak on the 
email disclosure issue.90  
  
 Here, the damage of disclosure has already been done, 
and considerations of finality and judicial efficiency dictate 
that we wait until the final appeal from conviction, should one 
occur, to decide the email issue. Should a jury convict the 
appellants, they will certainly have another, equally adequate, 
                                              
87 Dissent at 7. 
88 Fattah, 802 F.3d at 521, 531. 
89 Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 
868 (1994). 
90 The Dissent also suggests that we have jurisdiction because 
we retained jurisdiction pursuant to Perlman over a similar 
appeal in In re Grand Jury (ABC Corp.), 705 F.3d 133 
(2012). Dissent at 8. However, we are unpersuaded for the 
same reasons we are not convinced by the Dissent’s reliance 
on Fattah. In ABC Corp., the district court ordered disclosure 
of certain documents, and the targets of the grand jury 
investigation appealed. At the appellants’ request, we stayed 
the disclosure order. ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 140-42, 148. 
Thus, in ABC Corp., as in Fattah, the grand jury had not yet 
seen the documents, and exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 




opportunity to present their privilege claims. Under the 
circumstances here, we hold that we lack jurisdiction to 




In re Grand Jury Matter No. 3 
No. 15-2475 
_________________________________________________ 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting  
 My colleagues concede the possibility that we had 
jurisdiction at the beginning of this appeal but conclude that 
we lost it after John Doe 1 (“Doe”) was indicted. In my view, 
this fails to follow two of our previous decisions where we 
exercised post-indictment jurisdiction. Moreover, even if we 
were writing on a clean slate, I am concerned that the 
majority undermines the very efficiency interests it seeks to 
promote. Finally, our dismissal of Doe’s appeal leaves in 
place, at least for now, a decision on the merits that unduly 
erodes the protection of the attorney work product doctrine. I 
therefore respectfully dissent. 
I. 
 Because Doe’s criminal case has not yet proceeded to 
a final judgment, my colleagues conclude that his appeal is 
premature. However, this is not the typical instance of a court 
telling a litigant he has appealed too soon. That is because my 
colleagues do not conclude that the appeal was premature at 
the time it was filed. Rather, they leave open the possibility 
that, prior to the indictment, the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1918), provided us with 
jurisdiction.1 What they fail to explain is how an appeal, like 
                                              
1 There is no need to leave that question unresolved. Perlman 
certainly provided jurisdiction at the beginning of the case. 
As discussed later in this opinion, Perlman applies when a 
“disinterested” third party controls a privilege holder’s 
documents and is ordered to produce them. See In re Grand 
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Benjamin Button, can age in reverse, losing the maturity it 
previously had.  
                                                                                                     
Jury (ABC Corp.), 705 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 2012). The 
email at issue here was produced in response to a subpoena 
addressed to Doe’s accountant. My colleagues suggest that he 
would have been disinterested if he had been Doe’s former 
accountant at the time of the subpoena. However, because 
Doe still employed him at that time, they say he was not 
disinterested. They are nonetheless willing to posit the 
possibility that Perlman applied, but only because the 
accountant inadvertently produced the email. Maj. Op. at 14–
15. They derive the proposition that an appellant’s current 
agents are not disinterested (whereas his former agents are) 
from our decision in ABC Corp. However, as Judge Vanaskie 
noted in his partial dissent in that case, the majority opinion 
did not address that question. 705 F.3d at 166 (Vanaskie, J., 
dissenting in part). As he persuasively explained, it does not 
make sense to distinguish between current and former agents, 
and the “majority of . . . circuits that have addressed this 
issue” do not make such a distinction. Id. at 166–67. Indeed, 
we have previously applied Perlman to a subpoena addressed 
to an accounting company without asking whether it was a 
current or former agent. See Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. 
Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 103 (3d Cir. 1982). Rather 
than relying on a current/former dichotomy, what we instead 
held in ABC Corp. is that Perlman does not apply when an 
appellant and his agents are jointly subject to a court order 
mandating disclosure. 705 F.3d at 138 (majority opinion). 
Because Doe was never a party to the subpoena addressed to 
his accountant, this was a Perlman case even before the 




 On at least two occasions we have continued to 
exercise jurisdiction even after grand juries returned 
indictments. The majority’s approach conflicts with both of 
those prior cases. In the first case, the Government appealed 
an adverse ruling on a grand jury subpoena. At the outset of 
the appeal, our jurisdiction was clear because Congress had 
specifically given the Government the right to seek 
immediate review. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1040 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing 18 
U.S.C. § 3731). As the appeal was pending, however, the 
grand jury returned an indictment. We nonetheless concluded 
that, as long as the indictment did not render the appeal moot, 
we had jurisdiction to reach the merits. Because in that case 
the indictment “did not bring the grand jury’s proceedings to 
[their] conclusion,” a live controversy remained and our 
jurisdiction was intact. Id.2   
 The second decision, which involved Congressman 
Chaka Fattah and was issued just last year, is even more 
compelling because it, like our case, arose under Perlman. At 
the time Fattah filed his Perlman appeal, he was, like Doe, 
being investigated by a grand jury. Just as in our case, his 
status changed when the grand jury, after oral arguments in 
our Court but before we reached a decision, returned an 
indictment. See In re Search of Elec. Commc’ns in the 
Account of chakafattah@gmail.com at Internet Serv. Provider 
Google, Inc., 802 F.3d 516, 521 n.2 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“Fattah”). However, because his appeal related to the still-
ongoing review of his emails (thus giving us a live 
                                              
2 My colleagues rely on our discussion in Johanson of a 
separate appeal that was filed by the target of the grand jury 
investigation. As I discuss below, however, this has no 
bearing on Doe’s appeal.  
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controversy), we continued to exercise Perlman jurisdiction 
even after the indictment. Id. at 529–30. 
 To be sure, an intervening indictment can (and often 
will) moot a grand jury appeal. For instance, Doe through this 
appeal asks us to prevent the grand jury from relying on an 
email that he says is confidential. If after the indictment the 
grand jury investigation had ended, any harm from exposure 
to the email already had occurred. It would make sense in 
those circumstances to hold off until after the criminal 
proceedings are over before determining whether the grand 
jury was tainted. That is because there could be no ongoing 
violations—i.e., further use of the email by the grand jury—in 
the interim.  
 However, those are not our facts. Even after the 
indictment a newly empaneled grand jury continues to 
investigate Doe and may bring additional charges. In deciding 
whether to do so, it may make further use of the email that 
Doe is asking us to keep confidential. In our case, as in 
Johanson, the indictment “did not bring the grand jury’s 
proceedings to [their] conclusion,” so there is still potential 
harm we can prevent. Johanson, 632 F.2d at 1040. The 
purpose of this appeal thus remains the same as when it was 
first filed: deciding whether an email should be used as part 
of an ongoing grand jury investigation. Tellingly, both Doe 
and the Government agree that the appeal is not moot, and my 
colleagues do not take issue with that assessment. As a result, 
both Johanson and Fattah require us to reach the merits.  
 Instead of explaining why, despite our contrary case 
law, an indictment automatically cuts off jurisdiction that 
once existed and prevents us from deciding a live 
controversy, the majority looks at decisions that answer a 
different question: whether jurisdiction was ever proper under 
the collateral order rule. It relies primarily on a quote from 
 5 
 
Johanson. That case involved two separate appeals. As 
discussed, one was filed by the Government, and we 
continued to exercise jurisdiction even after an indictment.  
 The second appeal was filed by the target of the grand 
jury investigation (who became an indicted defendant as the 
appeal was pending). Unlike the Government, the target did 
not have the benefit of a statute providing pre-indictment 
jurisdiction. Nor was Perlman available. Instead, the target 
relied exclusively on the collateral order rule. That doctrine 
allows us to hear an appeal of an interlocutory order that “(1) 
conclusively determine[s] the disputed question; (2) 
resolve[s] an important issue completely separable from the 
merits of the action; and (3) [is] effectively unreviewable on 
appeal from a final judgment.” Bines v. Kulaylat, 215 F.3d 
381, 384 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In 
explaining why the target could not meet the third 
requirement, we made the statement on which my colleagues 
rely: that “flawed grand jury proceedings can be effectively 
reviewed by this court and remedied after a conviction has 
been entered and all criminal proceedings have been 
terminated in the district court.” Johanson, 632 F.2d at 1039. 
 The context for this statement makes all the difference. 
Importantly, we did not hold that we had jurisdiction under 
the collateral order rule before the indictment but lost it 
afterward. Instead, we concluded that we never had 
jurisdiction—even pre-indictment—to hear the target’s 
interlocutory appeal. Our reasoning would have been the 
same had he never been indicted.3  
                                              
3 In a separate passage, we held that the target’s appeal was 
also moot. Id. at 1039–40. This was in contrast to the 
Government’s appeal, which still presented a live 
controversy. Id. at 1040. The case thus stands for the 
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 So what is different here? In short, this case was never 
about the collateral order rule. From the outset it has been 
about Perlman. And in cases like ours, where jurisdiction was 
proper at the outset, we cannot say that deferred review is 
sufficient. If a post-trial appeal were a panacea, the statute 
that authorized the Government’s immediate appeal in 
Johanson (18 U.S.C. § 3731) would not exist. And neither 
would Perlman. My colleagues, by acknowledging the 
possibility that Perlman may have applied when the appeal 
was filed, have effectively conceded that we cannot force Doe 
to wait. That is because the Supreme Court has instructed us 
to assume in Perlman cases that an appeal “at some other 
time” is not good enough. Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13. 
 At first glance it might seem incongruous to say that 
review of Doe’s case after the criminal proceedings is 
sufficient under the collateral order rule but is not under 
Perlman. But there is a reason for this apparent anomaly, and 
it relates to Perlman’s origins. Perlman arose as an exception 
to the contempt rule. That rule applies when a privilege 
holder seeks review of an order to disclose information. It 
allows him to “disobey the court’s [disclosure] order, be held 
in contempt, and then [immediately] appeal the contempt 
order” rather than having to wait until the end of the case. See 
In re Grand Jury (ABC Corp.), 705 F.3d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 
2012). Sometimes, however, this option is unavailable 
because the court order is directed exclusively at a 
disinterested third party who is in control of the privilege 
holder’s documents. Because the privilege holder cannot 
                                                                                                     
uncontroversial point that often an indictment will moot an 
appeal, but other times it will not. Here, as discussed, Doe’s 
appeal falls into the latter category.   
 7 
 
refuse to obey a court order to which he is not subject, 
Perlman allows him to take an immediate appeal. Id.4  
 When a litigant relies on the collateral order rule alone, 
there is a presumption that, having not stood in contempt, he 
does not truly believe the dispute is worth immediate review. 
After all, the purpose of requiring contempt is to make sure 
that only “momentous” and “consequential” issues get an 
expedited appeal. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 
100, 112 (2009). However, when, as in Perlman cases, the 
contempt rule is unavailable, we do not know how strongly a 
party values the issue and how necessary prompt review is. 
As a result, we err on the side of caution and assume that an 
appeal after the trial is inadequate. Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13. 
 Our decision in Fattah is a prime example of these 
dynamics. Fattah argued that we had jurisdiction under both 
the collateral order rule and Perlman. We held that the 
collateral order rule did not apply because, among other 
considerations, any error that occurred was “reviewable upon 
appeal” after the criminal proceedings ended. 802 F.3d at 
526. Even though post-trial review was sufficient for our 
analysis under the collateral order rule, we nonetheless 
concluded that Perlman allowed for an immediate appeal. Id. 
at 529.  
                                              
4 My colleagues suggest that Doe could have availed himself 
of the contempt rule by getting the email from his accountant 
and then refusing to produce it. That suggestion would make 
sense if the subpoena had been directed at both Doe and the 
accountant. However, because it was addressed only to the 
latter, my colleagues’ proposed solution goes beyond what 
our case law requires of an appellant. See infra n.1. 
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 Similarly, in ABC Corp. we exercised Perlman 
jurisdiction even as we conceded that, had the case come to 
us under the collateral order rule, the “opportunity for post-
conviction review” would have been sufficient. 705 F.3d at 
145. We noted that Perlman and the collateral order rule are 
“separate” doctrines, meaning that the unavailability of the 
latter does not mean we cannot invoke the former. Id. at 145–
46. This observation applies with equal force here.  
 Put another way, my colleagues’ arguments 
persuasively demonstrate why we never at any stage of this 
case had jurisdiction under the collateral order rule. But the 
case law they cite, which does not turn on the presence or 
absence of an indictment, does not explain why, once 
jurisdiction is proper under a completely different theory 
(Perlman), we can be divested of our ability to decide a live 
controversy. As long as we had jurisdiction at the outset, 
Doe’s case is governed by our analysis of the Government’s 
appeal in Johanson and by our decision in Fattah. As in those 
cases, the indictment did not destroy jurisdiction that properly 
existed beforehand.  
 My colleagues have two responses to this critique. The 
first is their suggestion that Perlman itself was focused on 
pre-indictment jurisdiction. They note that the litigant in that 
case was attempting to prevent the “proposed use by the 
United States before the grand jury of [materials] as a basis 
for an indictment.” Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13. However, if 
Perlman only applied pre-indictment, then we could not have 
relied on it in Fattah. Moreover, Perlman is not limited to 
grand jury matters or even to criminal cases. See, e.g., Wm. T. 
Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100, 103 (3d 
Cir. 1982) (applying Perlman in a civil case). It simply 
cannot be that a doctrine that also applies to civil lawsuits 
turns on whether there has been an indictment. 
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 Next my colleagues, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Calandra, 706 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 
1983), note that the grand jury already saw the email that Doe 
claims is privileged. In their view, this makes it futile to apply 
Perlman. They say that the “jurors cannot un-see that email 
any more than the proverbial bell can be un-rung.” Maj. Op. 
at 16. However, this only applies to the first grand jury, which 
has already been discharged. As far as we are aware, the 
newly empaneled grand jury (the one that may charge Doe 
with additional offenses) has not yet seen it. Use of the email 
by this second, untainted grand jury is the outcome that Doe 
seeks to prevent. There is therefore no bell that needs to be 
un-rung.  
 In sum, my colleagues suggest that it is inappropriate 
for Doe to ask us to “peek into the merits” of his case at this 
early stage. Id. at 19. But that is what would have happened 
had we decided the case before the indictment. I know no 
reason for taking a different approach now.  
II. 
 My colleagues also argue that their position promotes 
judicial efficiency, as forcing parties to wait until final 
judgments “minimizes . . . opportunities to defeat . . . valid 
claims . . . through an endless barrage of appeals.” In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 190 F.3d 375, 379 (5th Cir. 1999). 
And they observe that, “[t]o be effective, judicial 
administration must not be leaden-footed. Its momentum 
would be arrested by permitting separate reviews of the 
component elements in a unified cause.” Cobbledick v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). 
 The problem is that these are arguments for why we 
should not have had jurisdiction at the outset of this appeal. 
When we are able to dismiss an appeal for lack of jurisdiction 
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as soon as it is filed, we achieve the benefits the majority 
notes. Specifically, the process continues uninterrupted in the 
trial court, and we are able to wait until all the appellate 
issues are neatly wrapped in a bow for us after a final 
judgment.  
 The same does not hold true here. Even under my 
colleagues’ approach, we will continue to accept pre-
indictment Perlman appeals. And, once we take them, we 
must begin to decide them, knowing all the while that we 
might have to put our pencils down at any moment if there is 
an indictment. Consider our case, which has been on our 
docket since June 2015. By the time Doe was indicted nearly 
ten months had passed, and the parties had fully briefed the 
case and presented oral arguments to us.  
 We must now disregard all of this and send the case 
back to the District Court. However, there is a very real 
possibility that it will be back. For instance, if Doe is 
convicted and files an appeal, the parties will need to re-brief 
and re-argue the same issue that we could have resolved 
already. And if we agree with Doe at that time, we may need 
to order a new trial (but see infra Part III)—another result that 
could have been avoided. Thus, in cases where we accept an 
appeal when it is filed, efficiency favors finishing what we 
started.  
 In response, my colleagues say that we “can only 
speculate” as to whether the issue will be back in front of us a 
second time. Maj. Op. at 20. If the potential harm truly were 
too speculative, we would have dismissed Doe’s appeal as 
moot. See, e.g., Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1117 (10th Cir. 2010) (“A case 
ceases to be a live controversy if the possibility of recurrence 
of the challenged conduct is only a speculative contingency.”) 
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). As 
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discussed, the parties agree that the existence of the second 
grand jury means that the possible harm to Doe is not too 
speculative, and my colleagues do not challenge that 
assessment. They cannot have it both ways. If the controversy 
is live enough that the case is not moot, we should decide it.  
III. 
 Having dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, 
my colleagues were not permitted to reach the substance of 
Doe’s appeal. Because I disagree with their conclusion, 
however, I am not similarly constrained. On the merits, I 
would reverse the District Court and conclude that the crime-
fraud exception to the attorney work product doctrine does 
not apply to the email at issue. In particular, I believe that one 
of the exception’s two requirements—the use of the 
communication in furtherance of a fraud—is lacking. The 
use-in-furtherance requirement provides a key safeguard 
against intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, and I 
am concerned that the District Court’s reasoning erodes that 
protection.  
 The introduction to the majority opinion provides 
much of the relevant background. To recap briefly, Company 
A was a defendant in a class action lawsuit. The plaintiffs in 
the suit were talking about trying to pierce the corporate veil. 
That means that, in addition to going after Company A’s 
assets, they would attempt to hold the owner of the company 
personally liable. The Government’s theory is that Doe 
owned Company A but tricked the plaintiffs into thinking that 
he had sold it to a business associate. The Government alleges 
that the reason for this deceit was to encourage the plaintiffs 
to settle for a lower value. This relies on the premise that, 
while Doe has deep pockets, the business associate does not.  
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 While the lawsuit was pending, Doe’s attorney sent 
him the email at the heart of this appeal. The attorney wrote 
that, although there was a “good faith transfer” to the business 
associate, Doe’s tax returns did not reflect the change in 
ownership. The email noted that, in order to “correct the 
record as best we can at this stage,” it “would be helpful” for 
Doe’s accountant to “correct [the] tax returns” by 
retroactively amending them. Doe then forwarded the email 
to his accountant and said, “Please see the seventh paragraph 
down re; [sic] my tax returns. Then we can discuss this.” 
There is no evidence that Doe ever amended his returns or did 
anything else, apart from forwarding the email, to follow up 
on his attorney’s suggestion. The accountant’s recollection is 
that Doe’s attorney later said not to go through with the 
amendments. The lawyer told the accountant to “stand by” for 
further guidance, which never came.  
 Everyone agrees that, barring the application of the 
crime-fraud exception, the email from Doe’s lawyer is 
protected by the attorney work product doctrine. That 
doctrine, which is the sibling of the attorney-client privilege, 
preserves the confidentiality of legal communications 
prepared in anticipation of litigation. Shielding work product 
from disclosure “promotes the adversary system by enabling 
attorneys to prepare cases without fear that their work product 
will be used against their clients.” Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 
v. Republic of Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1428 (3d Cir. 
1991). Though Doe waived the attorney-client privilege by 
forwarding the email to his accountant, the document still 
retained its work product status. See id. 
 Work product protection, though fundamental to the 
proper functioning of the legal system, is not absolute. As 
relevant here, the crime-fraud exception operates to prevent 
the perversion of the attorney-client relationship. It does so by 
allowing disclosure of certain communications that would 
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otherwise be confidential. “[A] party seeking to apply the 
crime-fraud exception must demonstrate that there is a 
reasonable basis to suspect (1) that the [lawyer or client] was 
committing or intending to commit a crime or fraud, and (2) 
that the . . . attorney work product was used in furtherance of 
that alleged crime or fraud.” ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 155. 
 The Government can readily satisfy the first 
requirement. Though ultimately it will be up to a jury to 
determine whether Doe committed fraud, there is at least a 
reasonable basis to believe he did. Even setting aside the 
email, the Government has a recording where Doe allegedly 
brags about defrauding the class action plaintiffs. He 
purportedly admits in that recording to telling his associate—
the same one who was supposed to have already purchased 
Company A—“I’ll pay you ten grand a month if you will step 
up to the plate and say that you [own the company] and upon 
the successful completion of the lawsuit [I’ll] give you fifty 
grand.” 
 This evidence is strong, but it is not sufficient by itself 
to pierce the work product protection. We have been clear 
that “evidence of a crime or fraud, no matter how compelling, 
does not by itself satisfy both elements of the crime-fraud 
exception.” In re Chevron Corp., 633 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 
2011). Rather, the second requirement—use in furtherance—
exists for the same reason that certain conspiracy statutes 
require proof that a defendant engaged in an overt act to 
further the crime. In both settings we want to make sure that 
we are not punishing someone for merely thinking about 
committing a bad act. Instead, as Justice Holmes noted in the 
conspiracy context, we ask for evidence that the plan “has 
passed beyond words and is [actually] on foot.” Hyde v. 




 In that sense, requiring an act in furtherance 
distinguishes between situations where the attorney-client 
relationship works and those where it malfunctions. For 
instance, if a client approaches a lawyer with a fraudulent 
plan that the latter convinces the former to abandon, the 
relationship has worked precisely as intended. We therefore 
reward this forbearance by keeping the work product 
protection intact. If, by contrast, the client uses work product 
to further a fraud, the relationship has broken down, and the 
lawyer’s services have been “misused.” In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 445 F.3d 266, 279 (3d Cir. 2006). Only in that 
limited circumstance—misuse of work product in furtherance 
of a fraud—does the scale tip in favor of breaking 
confidentiality.  
 Here the only purported act in furtherance identified 
by the District Court was Doe forwarding the email to his 
accountant. If Doe had followed through and retroactively 
amended his tax returns, I would have no trouble finding an 
act in furtherance. Even if he had told the accountant to 
amend them and later gotten cold feet and called off the plan, 
there would still be a case to be made. That is because the 
Government “does not have to show that the intended crime 
or fraud was accomplished, only that the lawyer’s advice or 
other services were misused.” Id. (quoting In re Public 
Defender Serv., 831 A.2d 890, 910 (D.C. 2003)).  
 As it is, however, none of that happened. Doe merely 
forwarded the email to the accountant and said he wanted to 
“discuss” it. There is no indication that he had ever decided to 
amend the returns, and before the plan could proceed further 
the lawyer apparently pulled the plug by telling the 
accountant to hold off. Thus Doe at most thought about using 
his lawyer’s work product in furtherance of a fraud, but he 
never actually did so. What happened here is not so different 
from Doe merely writing a private note, not sent to anyone, 
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reminding himself to think about his lawyer’s suggestion. The 
absence of a meaningful distinction between these scenarios 
shows why finding an act in furtherance here lacks a limiting 
principle and risks overcoming confidentiality based on mere 
thought. 
 The District Court gave two reasons for its conclusion 
that Doe used his lawyer’s work product in furtherance of a 
fraud. Both are flawed. First, the Court suggested that Doe, in 
forwarding the email to his accountant, “took [his lawyer’s] 
advice” about amending the tax returns. Joint Appendix 16. It 
is not clear what the Court meant by this because, as it 
acknowledged, Doe “never followed through with amending” 
the returns. Id. Second, the Court said that the failure to 
follow through “is of no consequence” as long as Doe 
intended, as of the time he forwarded the email, to amend the 
returns. Id. This is no doubt an accurate statement of the law. 
See ABC Corp., 705 F.3d at 155. The problem is that there is 
simply no record evidence suggesting that Doe had ever made 
up his mind. 
 None of this suggests that, in the event Doe is 
convicted and appeals, he should automatically get a new trial 
based on the Government’s use of protected work product. 
That is because the Government could avoid a retrial by 
showing the error was harmless. Bank of Nova Scotia v. 
United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255–56 (1988). I express no 
opinion on this harmlessness question.  
 16 
 
* * * * * 
 Many grand jury appeals will become moot after the 
return of an indictment. Indeed, the presence of a new grand 
jury that is continuing to investigate makes this case out of 
the ordinary. But where, as here, a live controversy remains, 
an indictment should not automatically preclude us from 
deciding it. The majority, however, has crafted a rule that 
risks divesting us of jurisdiction in all Perlman cases where 
there is an indictment, even ones where our pre-indictment 
jurisdiction is ironclad. I believe this rule is foreclosed by our 
precedent and, in any event, is counterproductive. It also has 
the unfortunate effect of preventing us, at least for the time 
being, from correcting what I view as a mistaken decision on 
the merits. I therefore respectfully dissent.  
